

Webinar: COVID-19 and re-opening the economy

Jointly Organized with the Society for Financial Studies

WITH JOHN COCHRANE STANFORD UNIVERSITY

Monday, May 18, 12:30 PM ET Pre-Registration Required



Intro: MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER

Twitter: @MarkusEconomist

Markus' Zoominar intro

- Previous/future webinars
 - Paul Krugman
 - Larry Summers
 - Next Monday is memorial day

Speakers

Externally vs. internally recession Q&A: COVID & Global Economy

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Beergarden opening today in Bavaria

High-tech service only

app ordering, app reservations, distancing, ...



- Question: Will customers come back?
 - Supply restriction due to regulation
 - Demand collapse due to fear

lockdown shutdown?


Re-opening: Lessons from China

subway ridership in 30 major Chinese cities

2020 vs. 2019

... most recovery only work-related

Missing "Friday spike"



В С

BCF

Flattening or Crushing the Curve

Flattening the curve

- Bring it below ICU coverage
- ... but SIR models ultimately go for herd immunity
 - Not sensible if
 - immunity does not last or
 - Iong-lasting health damage

Crushing the curve

- Return to tracing of individual cases
- ... not herd immunity


Does re-opening imply a choice btw both?

5/18/2020 Markus' zominar





- Re-opening imposes large fixed costs to firms
 - Significant investment for SMEs
 - beergarden app for ordering, ...



If flare-up leads to second wave and second shut-down

- Firms are more likely to go bankrupt (after investments)
- Firms are very reluctant to re-open after second shut-down

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Synchronized opening?



- Supply chain/value chains
- Global demand dependent
- Differentiation
 - More focused
 - Regional experimentation

С В



- Input-output table analysis to design opening
 - Essentiality
 - Health risk
- Public/centralized:
 - Since private actors will not internalize externalities fully
- Private:
 - Since private actors are more creative to find best practice to open up
- Competition for best business practice to open up (within industry).
 - Firm with "best plan" is allowed to open first
 - Like a patent (temporary monopoly power)



Employers suffers outbreak, unemployment

Communication can amplify uncertainty

Add endogenous risk to exogenous risk

Economic consequences:

Rise in uncertainty

- Lower investment

 Iower growth

 inflationary
- Higher savings in safe asset $\Rightarrow r^f$
 - Gov. budget deficit 🔪
- Inequality /

inflation pressures

- ➡ disinflationary
 - disinflationary

Poll 01:

- 1. Economies should open up
 - a. Rather soon
 - b. Wait, since it is too risky
- 2. Opening should be governed by
 - a. Free decision/flexibility by government
 - b. Clear ex-ante rules
- 3. Selectively opening is based on
 - a. Health risk
 - b. Essentiality
 - c. Other criteria (developed by the government)
- 4. Opening procedure should be planned centrally
 - a. Yes, since private firms don't internalize externalities
 - b. No, since central planning stifles innovation how to creatively manage new COVID economy



End of MARKUS' INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

Now

Please ask questions in Q&A box

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COVID-19 and re-opening the economy

John H. Cochrane May 17 2020 Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University "The grumpy economist"




The dumb reopening


Ready or not, a dumb reopening. No widespread test, trace, isolate; public health. Fizzle out vs. second wave? Models were completely wrong last time

SIR model (February)

$\Delta S_{t+1} = -\beta S_t I_t / N$	Susceptible
$\Delta I_{t+1} = \beta S_t I_t / N - \gamma I_t$	Infected
$\Delta R_{t+1} = \gamma I_t - \theta R_t$	Resolving (sick)
$\Delta D_{t+1} = \delta \theta R_t$	Dead
$\Delta C_{t+1} = (1 - \delta)\theta R_t$	ReCovered



- Exponential growth, until herd immunity
- R brought down by contact with immune.
- Sweeps through in months. 60-80% get it. 2% = 5 million die. Ends swiftly.
- Utterly wrong. Why? Behavior and Heterogeneity.




Behavioral SIR models

$\Delta S_{t+1} = -\beta S_t I_t / N$	Susceptible
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
People respond to current infection rate






- Behavior: People and governments change behavior.
- More infected people around: Work harder to avoid contact.
- Private behavior vs. business shutdown sledgehammer.
- Fundamentally different mechanism for limiting R.
- Converges to R=1. Getting better at it = slow recovery.
- Bad news: with us a long time absent magic bullet.
- It's all about R<1, cost of lower R.

People get better at cost-effective mitigation Doubles over time α






Behavioral SIR models – a warning

$$\begin{array}{ll} \Delta S_{t+1} = -\beta S_t I_t / N & \text{Susceptible} \\ \Delta I_{t+1} = \beta S_t I_t / N - \gamma I_t & \text{Infected} \\ \Delta R_{t+1} = \gamma I_t - \theta R_t & \text{Resolving (sick)} \\ \Delta D_{t+1} = \delta \theta R_t & \text{Dead} \\ \Delta C_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) \theta R_t & \text{ReCovered} \end{array}$$


People respond to current death rate



- Current, accurate information on the current local infection rate, location and nature of hotspots is vital.
- Just a little random testing would be really cheap relative to \$5 trillion dollars.
- Don't try to lie.

- Heterogeneity. \bullet
 - Superspreading activities and places.
 - Public vs. private health: R<1 is enough.
- Testing. Savior or panacea? ullet
 - Massive failure of / lack of low-level bureaucratic public health capacity.
 - Test, track, trace, coercive isolation? Not in US.
- Summer/fall. Productivity and reallocation shock. (Demand/precautionary saving too) \bullet
 - Information: How does (and doesn't) this spread.
- Policy. \bullet
 - From insurance to disincentives. Unemployment. Rent. Mortgage payments?
 - Regulation.
- Macro / Finance policy. ullet
 - Why not great vacation? Debt.
 - Fed & cares support, lending predicated on V shaped recession.
 - Fed: no creditor may lose money, no price may fall.
 - Forecast much more money financed payout, Fed market support.
- Legacy.
 - Moral hazard. Over and over again is not an expedient, it's a regime.
 - Debt (short term!) and reserves.
 - Does debt not matter? Wisdom of spending not amount of spending. Stimulus checks.
 - 1000 years of history to test.

• Just put Summers (secular stagnation) Blanchard (r>g, no matter how you expand debt) Kelton (MMT) vs



- WWII / UK 1800s were paid by steady primary surpluses, strong supply side (productivity) growth in a much less regulated economy.
- Any other success story for 150% D/ GDP?