




Emerging Markets: Taper Tantrum Redux?

Robin Brooks

IIF

Markus Brunnermeier

1. April 2021




Sudden “Stop & Go” in international capital flows

- March 2020 outflow, followed by inflow, followed by ...

- **2 Sudden Stop Theories**

- Traditional debt focused
- Safe Asset perspective



Source: National sources via Bloomberg.
Episode start dates: September 8, 2008 for Global Financial Crisis,
May 22, 2013 for Taper Tantrum, July 26, 2015 for China Scare,
and January 21, 2020 for COVID-19.
Excludes China. See panel 1 for list of countries included.

Sudden Stop: traditional view

- Multiple equilibrium feature of debt
(foreign currency denominated)

- Good equilibrium

- Low interest rate r low default probability

- Bad equilibrium

- High interest rate r high default probability
(expected restructuring costs)

JUMP

- Jump leads to re-evaluation of foreign denominated debt


Sudden Stop: Safe Asset Perspective

- Loss of (domestic) safe asset status
 - Brunnermeier Sannikov (2019) “International monetary theory: Safe Asset Perspective”
 - Brunnermeier Merkel Sannikov (2021) “A Safe Asset Perspective on IPF”
- Asset Price = $E[\text{PV}(\text{cash flows})] + E[\text{PV}(\text{service flows})]$
 - dividends/interest
 - Service flows/convenience yield
 1. Collateral: relax constraints (Lagrange multiplier)
 2. Safe asset: [good friend analogy]
 - When one needs funds, one can sell at stable price ... since others buy
 - Partial insurance through retrading - market liquidity! + Negative β
 3. Money (narrow): relax double-coincidence of wants
 - Higher Asset Price = lower expected return [Exorbitant privilege]
- Problem: safe asset status might burst like a bubble $r < g$
 - Multiple equilibria: [safe asset tautology]

What's a Safe Asset?

- Asset Price = $E[\text{PV}(\text{cash flows})]$ + $E[\text{PV}(\text{service flows})]$


dividends/interest
convenience yield



What's a Safe Asset?


- Asset Price = $E[\text{PV}(\text{cash flows})]$ + $E[\text{PV}(\text{service flows})]$
dividends/interest convenience yield

- Value come from **re-trading**




Loss of Safe Asset Status: From **Risk-on** to **Risk-off**

- Bubble condition: $r = r^f + \text{risk premium} < g$
 - AE: safe asset has negative $\beta \Rightarrow \text{risk premium} < 0$
 - see “Debt as Safe Asset” paper
 - EM: loss of safe asset status risk $\Rightarrow \text{risk premium} > 0$

 - Risk-on vs. risk-off
 - Price of risk rises
 - Risk of EM rises to lose local safe asset status } \Rightarrow Risk premium rises
- 

Loss of Safe Asset Status: **US Monetary Policy Spillovers**

- Bubble condition: $r = r^f + \text{risk premium} < g$
 - No flight to safety condition: $r \geq r^{\$}$
- } Sandwiched!
- 
- Problem: Raise r in response to higher $r^{\$}$
 - Exceeds growth rate g
 - Lowers growth rate g

} \Rightarrow "safe asset bubble bursts"
 - Citizens save in international safe asset instead of local safe asset
-
- Ideal arrangement:
 - Use local safe asset for idiosyncratic risk (within EM)
 - Use international safe asset for country-wide shocks

Poll Questions

1. How high will the 10-year Treasury yield go by the end of the year?
 - a. 1.7% (i.e. current levels)
 - b. 2.0% (i.e. a bit higher)
 - c. 2.5% (or higher)
2. Will rising US interest rates cause a repeat of the 2013 taper tantrum for EM?
 - a. Yes
 - b. No
3. What should EMs do if their currencies get hit like in 2013?
 - a. Let them fall
 - b. Intervene or hike interest rates
 - c. Capital controls

Taper Tantrum Redux

EM in 2021 versus 2013

April 2021

Robin Brooks, Managing Director & Chief Economist



Outline

Rising US long-term yields


- There are many parallels with 2013 taper tantrum.
- Back then, the Fed initially welcomed rising yields.
- But yields overshoot and the Fed had to react.
- Risk of a similar overshoot in 2021 is high.

Emerging market flows

- Emerging markets saw large outflows in 2020.
- But foreign holdings have also grown over time.
- Scaling for this, 2020 was $\frac{1}{4}$ as bad as 2008.



EM in 2021 versus 2013

- On the surface, initial conditions are better now.
- But the underlying challenge is a lack of growth.





Rising US Long-Term Yields

- The Fed initially welcomed rising long-term yields in 2013.
- But yields overshot, leading to the Sep 2013 “no taper” surprise.





Rising US Long-Term Yields

- Markets became very sensitive to data surprises in 2013.
- Positive data surprises became important for 10-year yield.





Rising US Long-Term Yields

- Risk of an overshoot in real interest rates is building.
- This is foremost a communication challenge for the Fed.





Emerging Market Flows

- We track daily foreign investors flows to 14 EMs.
- Rising US yields have weighed on flows to non-China EM.





Emerging Market Flows

- We aggregate these daily flows to a quarterly frequency.
- China flows are completely distinct from non-China EM.





Emerging Market Flows

- Our daily flows have a high correlation with official BoP data.
- We're constantly adding new countries to our daily series.





Emerging Market Flows

- We scale flows by the stock of foreign holdings from the IIP.
- This allows us to compare Q1 & Q2 2020 to Q3 & Q4 2008.





Emerging Market Flows

- Outflows were 4% of assets in 2008 versus 1% in 2020.
- Turkey, Poland and Brazil were hit harder than in 2008.





Emerging Market Flows

- We look at 2013 tantrum, 2015 RMB deval & 2018 EM sell-off.
- Non-China EM saw inflows in 2013. Not so in 2015 & 2018.





Emerging Market Flows

- China is an outlier in EM: consistent inflows except 2015.
- Pre-COVID, Argentina, Russia, India & Thailand are hardest hit.





EM in 2021 versus 2021

- Some initial conditions coming into 2021 look better.
- Less foreign portfolio inflows, REERs have not risen as much.





EM in 2021 versus 2013

- But that positive picture might be deceptive.
- China may be diverting flows away from non-China EM.





EM in 2021 versus 2013

- Emerging markets suffered many adverse shocks since 2013.
- The real crisis in EM has been a lack of growth for many years.



EM in 2021 versus 2013

- Turkey & Argentina are fighting this EM growth slowdown.
- That fight has just produced volatility around a declining trend.



EM in 2021 versus 2013

- Fragile 5 in 2013: Brazil, India, Indonesia, South Africa, Turkey.
- Those countries are still vulnerable, as well as any Dollar pegs.

